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Abstract 
The paper seeks to explore the implications of transnational and global history for 
comparative historical sociology, especially in light of notions of entangled history, 
postcolonial critiques, theories of the ‘Global South,’ new interpretations of empire. It offers 
an assessment of the implications of the transnational turn for comparative history, arguing 
that despite some of the claims made that this should largely be seen as a shift than a turn and 
as a corrective than a fundamentally new paradigm. Following from a discussion of some of 
the issues that have arisen from the transnational turn, in particular with respect to the work 
of a new generation of global historians, such as Bayly, Osterhammel and Pomeranz, the 
paper then considers the different contribution of comparative historical sociology, including 
civilisational analysis, as in the work of Eisenstadt and Arnason. The argument is advanced 
that while comparative historical sociology is today in crisis as a result of being overtaken by 
developments within transnational and global history, it offers much promise. The two fields 
cannot be entirely separated, but comparative historical sociology has a strong tradition of 
comparative analysis that is different from historiographical analysis and which remains 
undeveloped. The specificity of the sociological dimension is urgently in need of renewal. It 
is argued that this largely resides in an interpretative approach to social inquiry. However, 
this has not yet been fully exploited in relation to transnationalism. 
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Classical sociology was inherently historical. This is hardly surprising since much of 
sociology emerged from historical inquiry and its major questions were historical ones, such 
as the emergence of modern society, the transition from feudalism to capitalism, the 
formation of the modern state, the influence of the reformation on capitalism. While modern 
empirical sociology, in particular qualitative sociology, broke the link with history, it was 
preserved in macro-sociology and many of the main approaches in social theory were very 
much about historical questions. Indeed, all big picture theorising inevitably entails historical 
analysis. It was arguably the case that sociology, in particular comparative historical 
sociology, took over the task from historians in accounting for the relationship of the past to 
the present and its future. Some of the most important accounts of historical transformations 
were undertaken either by sociologists or by interdisciplinary theorists, such as Karl Polanyi 
and Barrington Moore.  
The nature of historical writing has changed and historians have regained the ground 
occupied by comparative historical sociologists especially on major questions relating to 
transnationalism. The beginnings of this can be found in world history, but with the recent 
rise and huge growth of transnational and global history, a major methodological shift has 
taken place in historiographical analysis, although, as I shall argue, this has not been fully 
theorised. While that shift has indeed produced a crisis in comparative analysis, it has also led 
to a crisis of a different nature in comparative historical sociological analysis, which in many 
ways appears to be overtaken by the shift to the transnational. The paper begins by discussing 
the rise and significance of transnational and global history for comparative analysis as 
practised largely by historians. The second part of the paper looks at comparative historical 
sociology more specifically and in relation to transnationalism. The main focus here will be 
on civilisational analysis and what I see as its weak theorisation of transnationalism. The 
third section of the paper considers the future of comparative historical sociology in light of 
its current crisis and considers how comparative analysis and transnationalism could be 
linked. 
 
Transnational and Global History 
The very conception of narratives of historical time has been hugely challenged by 
developments relating to transnational and global history, which appear to question the 
centrality given to nations in older approaches to historical writing that took for granted the 
  
spatial and temporal categories of modernity.i This is to a large degree the result of the 
influence on historical writing of developments within the social sciences, in particular in 
relation to culture and agency. Both cultural theory and social theory since the 1980s led to 
entirely new insights into the nature of culture and society that challenged the presuppositions 
of historiographical scholarship, which largely saw its task to be the narration of the nation. 
The so-called linguistic turn in modern thought along with the revolution brought about by 
Foucault led to new insights about power, knowledge and the making of modern subjectivity. 
These developments at first questioned only the foundations of western modernity - opening 
up new and hidden histories that were supressed by the dominant discourses - and had no 
implications for global analysis. In fact, Foucault himself initially did not question the 
implications of his approach for the analysis of the non-western world. Indeed, the ruptures 
he wrote about in The Order of Things referred only to discontinuities within western thought 
and practice. 
The transnational shift in historical analysis itself preceded the linguistic turn, but was 
given a major impetus by new thinking about culture and power since Foucault. The orthodox 
approaches had presupposed a Eurocentric understanding of the world. Edward Said’s signal 
work, Orientalism, in 1979 paved the way for a new and fresh approach to history, even if in 
the final analysis he produced a theory that had major methodological problems. Its main 
contribution was to provide a foundation for postcolonial theory and a critique of 
Eurocentrism.  However, one should not forget that the Eurocentric assumptions of 
nineteenth century historical analysis were earlier challenged within the relatively separate 
area of world history, the practioners of which were often historical sociologists or 
interdisciplinary oriented historians, such William McNeil, Marshall Hodgson, and the 
Annales School from Fernand Braudel to Immanuel Wallerstein.  This was long before Said’s 
contribution and not acknowledged by him. World history certainly had its limits; it was 
largely confined to the analysis of the world system prior to the early modern period and was 
principally concerned with the rise of the major world civilisations. Many developments 
today in transnational and global history as well as the contributions of postcolonial thought 
were anticipated in the works of these historians. Today world history has been largely 
overtaken by global history and derives from a new generation of interdisciplinary historians, 
such as Kenneth Pomeranz and Jürgen Osterhammel rather than historical sociologists as 
such, many of whom have retreated into institutional analysis. Yet, for several decades it was 
one of the main alternatives to conventional nation based historical writing, as well as to 
  
international history, which is also based on the presupposition of nations as the main 
historical actors. 
While comparative history has been very much challenged following the rise of the 
transnational and global history, it should not be forgotten that comparative history was 
probably the most significant alternative to mainstream national history. Even if it is guilty of 
the methodological nationalism that it has often charged with, comparative history cannot be 
seen as an ideology of nationalism. After all, comparison is about placing a given unit in a 
larger context which in turn leads to the relativising of its apparent uniqueness. Clearly 
comparative analysis did not question the notion of territorially bounded nations per se, 
seeking instead to explore differences and or similarities with other nations. The dominant 
tendency has undoubtedly been to compare differences - the nature of the exception - 
reinforcing the coherence of national societies as units of analysis. There were undoubtedly 
Eurocentric assumptions also underlying it, where the unit of comparison was generally about 
how other parts of the world diverged from Europe. The crisis of comparative analysis is 
highlighted by the fate of the sonderweg thesis – the special path of German history – which 
has now been resolutely refuted with the recognition that every country is a special case, thus 
making comparison impossible if not meaningless in so far as it is about the analysis of the 
exception. 
In contrast, world historians - many of whom were interdisciplinary sociologists - 
sought to identify signs of common worlds across a broad range of societies, though this was 
not always with comparison as the goal. Yet, comparison was always there implicit in their 
analyses. Another limitation of comparative historical analysis is that it was not concerned 
with comparison itself as an object of analysis, that is to say it did not concern itself with the 
ways in which societies consciously compare themselves to other societies (see Seigal 2005). 
The assumption of comparative analysis is not only that national societies are the main units 
of analysis, but that their interactions are of limited significance. This is one of the main 
drawbacks of Skocpol’s (1979) - in this case a comparative historical sociologist - famous 
comparative study of the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions. Her otherwise exemplary 
and now classic work never considered that the very condition of the possibility of the latter 
cases was the influence of the French revolution. 
This is where the ground has shifted. The presumptions of methodological 
nationalism and Eurocentrism have been challenged by the shift to the transnational, which 
has informed both transnational and global history. I am using both of these more or less 
  
interchangeably despite their differences. It is probably more important to speak of a ‘turn’ 
than a ‘shift’, since the basic insights were already present in the older tradition of world 
history. Transnational history is not necessarily global history, while global history generally 
entails a concern with transnationalism since it is focussed on global processes and how the 
world is becoming more globally connected. The former is often concerned with major world 
regions - Europe, the Indian Ocean, the Atlantic world for instance - or major interactions of 
world regions, such as European and Asian linkages and also with new conceptions of 
empire. Some qualifications are undoubtedly needed on the notion of the transnational. As 
used here, which I think reflects current use, transnationalism does not operate on the 
presumption of nations that simply interact with other nations. The emphasis is rather on the 
‘trans’ in that what is foregrounded are processes of interaction which transform the very 
units in question and bring into being new units. There may indeed be a problem with the 
notion of transnationalism in that the term does not literally designate phenomena that are not 
national. It is obviously also problematical when it comes to pre-modern constellations in a 
world in which the nation did not yet exist, such as the Carolingian Empire or the Holy 
Roman Empire, since these were pre-national.  Notwithstanding these problems, there is not 
an adequate alternative available, other than possibly transcultural. Global history, the most 
obvious competing concept, refers to broader processes that pertain to the world as a whole, 
but this may not be appropriate for many topics that require something larger than nations, 
but smaller than the world as a whole.  
The shift to the transnational has led to a questioning of five assumptions of 
comparative history, which can be only briefly stated and undoubtedly too simplistically, 
since it is unlikely than all assumptions are to be found together in the work of any major 
historian, at least since the 1980s. The first is the idea that nations are homogeneous; the 
second is the view that nations are somehow autonomous actors relatively isolated from each 
other; the third, which follows from the previous two, is that the units of comparison are 
relatively comparable; the fourth is that the modern West can be understood in isolation from 
the rest of the world; and fifth the assumption that the established concepts deriving from the 
western human and social sciences can be used to study non-western societies, despite their 
very different histories.  
Transnational and global history, taken together, have produced alternative visions of 
the world which have challenged these assumptions – which not have been explicitly held by 
any one  – but not necessarily undermined the possibility of comparison. There are numerous 
  
examples of how our understanding of the world has been fundamentally changed as a result 
of the shift to the transnational. Instead of a vision of an ordered world organised temporally 
by western notions of periodisation and spatiality we have instead a new emphasis on 
entangled histories. Nations, civilisations and world regions are not only heterogeneous but 
interlinked and interlinked to a degree that makes heterogeneity possible. Such interlinkages 
cannot be explained only in terms of exogamous factors in a way that would privilege 
endogenous accounts of defined units, such as a nation or a civilisation. The presumption is 
not that there firstly exist defined cultural units, which subsequently interact with other units, 
since the interactions are structure forming. 
The accounts differ, as to whether the emphasis is on influences, connections or on 
hybrid entities. The recent emphasis on entangled history would see such links as of 
considerably greater significance than influences that need to be taken into account (see 
Manjapra, 2014; Werner and Zimmermann, 2006). Entangled history draws attention to links 
that are also more than connections, encounters, exchange, etc but are formative of the units 
that are involved in the relationship and thus point to the formation of units of analysis that 
are interdependent and hybrid. This is because many transnational connections brought about 
a change in the units that came into contact and as a result they are no longer separate units to 
be compared. 
This seems to me to be the crux of the matter. Comparative history has tended to 
presuppose relatively defined units of analysis in terms of time and space. The upshot of 
transnational and global history is to decentre spatial and temporal categories by 
demonstrating how they arose; it puts in place different categories that capture more 
accurately the nature of transnational flows in terms of their hybrid and interdependent 
character. However, transnational and global history cannot quite do away with comparison, 
since it must be able to show how transnational connections bring about a changed situation 
from the one that previously existed. Additionally due to the ramifications of the interaction, 
the changes in the interacting units must be compared.  
The historical literature however is characterised by weak theoretical 
conceptualisations of transnationalism. The work of historians such as Christopher Bayly 
(2004), Jürgen Osterhammel (2014) and Kenneth Pommeranz (2000, 2007) represent the best 
of work in the field. Yet, they do not provide a theory of transnationalism and the fate of 
comparison remains unclear, despite the admirable efforts of Jürgen Kocka, who has argued 
for the compatibility of comparative analysis and transnational and global history (Haupt and 
  
Kocka 2009; see also Anderson, 1998; Levine 2014). However, it is evident that transnational 
and global historians rely on some notion of comparison, even if what they compare is not 
necessarily nations. 
A related but different problem, mentioned above, that the shift to the transnational 
has brought about is how to analyse non-western histories using concepts that are often 
highly problematical when applied to contexts where the historical reality is such that the 
reality that the describe does not exist, for example the notion of religion, church, civil 
society, classes etc. On this view, taken to the extreme, there is both an epistemological and 
ontological clash between the transnational vision and the comparative method due to the 
incommensurability or untranslatability of different historical contexts. This would imply that 
instead of connected histories there are instead only irreconcilable differences. However this 
would be an unnecessary conclusion because a degree of cultural and linguistic translation 
can rectify many problems (see Chakrabarty 2000 and Delanty 2014). Clearly there are 
European specific concepts – such as feudalism – that cannot be applied, but there are others 
– such as the notion of the state – which if not universally valid have proven to be workable 
concepts and others – for example cosmopolitanism which may be transferable to other 
contexts if a suitable register of meaning can be found. 
The question is how significant are these developments and whether what they have 
brought about is a new paradigm – a ‘turn’  – or whether the shift to the transnational  is a 
corrective than the death knell of comparative analysis. The answer is partly a matter of how 
precisely the question is posed. There can be no doubt that transnationalism  has been hugely 
significant and not unlike the revolution in historical thinking brought about by Foucault in 
placing at the centre of historical analysis hidden histories, the confluence of power and 
systems of knowledge. However, we cannot conclude that comparative analysis is dead, 
though this is certainly the direct implication of much of recent scholarship in transnational 
and global history and where it is not, it is the indirect outcome. The argument put forward 
here should be qualified: comparative historical analysis remains strong and it may be 
strengthened by the combined efforts of historians and sociologists. 
While the method of comparing differences – with its traditional focus on the 
exception  – does appear to be seriously challenged in some respects by the shift to the 
transnational, comparative historical analysis is much broader. The method of comparing 
similarities, for example, is still the basis of much of transnational and global history. 
Comparison is unavoidable in any kind of large scale historical analysis. Much of 
  
transnational and global history does not fundamentally undermine the possibility of 
comparison, unless the extreme position of incommensurability is taken. The units in the 
comparison do not have to be nations or temporally and spatially fixed entities. It is in this 
respect that historical sociology can provide an alternative solution to the crisis of 
comparison.   
Before moving onto look at historical sociology to the extent to which it can be 
separately identified, I would also like to comment that there was also a second shift in 
history, namely from structural history to conceptual history, brought about by Koselleck, a 
move that opened up greater space for the role of agency and, extending this to the work of 
Hayden White on metahistory, has major implications for interpretation. This indeed could be 
termed more of a ‘turn’ than a ‘shift’.  As part of the wider cultural or interpretative turn, 
these developments have significant implications for comparison, which rather than 
undermining it, have opened up new avenues, but as far as transnationalism is concerned this 
has remained somewhat underdeveloped.ii This is perhaps where the real shift in has 
occurred. The problem looked at from this perspective is then less how comparative analysis 
is undermined by the transnational and global analysis, than how to reconcile the latter with 
the interpretative approaches, including those of Koselleck and other conceptual historians.  
 
Developments in Comparative Historical Sociology 
Historians working in the broad field of transnational and global history rarely if ever clarify 
the nature of comparative analysis. Many have adopted encyclopaedic style syntheses, such 
as Osterhammel’s (2014) survey of the nineteenth century, Benjamin’s (2009) study of the 
Atlantic world or Burbank and Cooper’s (2011) study of world empires. Yet, all necessarily 
reply on comparison. A major survey of the twentieth century such as Eric Hobsbawm’s 
much praised work appears to operate with a chronology that only with considerable 
difficulty could be applied to wider world.iii Historical sociology, on the other hand, has had a 
rich tradition of comparative analysis that on the whole has not been based on the 
epistemological and ontological assumptions of nations as the given units of comparison. As 
mentioned earlier, world history itself emerged around largely macro-sociological analysis. 
However, world sociology has been overshadowed by global history, which in having 
pioneered major research has led to an unclarified relationship with comparative history, 
which has been additionally confused with the rise of new notions of entangled history. 
Wherein all of this is comparative historical sociology? 
  
Classical comparative historical sociology, with its close connection with world 
history, has always been highly interdisciplinary. This was above all the legacy of Weber’s 
comparative sociology of the world’s civilisations. A great deal of it was influenced by 
Marxist analysis and has been primarily concerned with the macro-sociological analysis of 
major transformations in society in the course of history. It was also a feature of Durkheim’s 
sociology and the view, deeply engrained in classical sociology, that sociology is by its 
nature comparative. Comparative historical sociology was undoubtedly more comparative in 
its aims than primarily concerned with empirical analysis in that it largely relied on specialist 
historical research for its sources. This gave to it a strongly theoretical slant that was a 
contrast to the history practised by historians. However, the two disciplines, history and 
sociology, cannot be so easily separated, as illustrated by the work of Barrington Moore, 
Charles Tilly or Michael Mann all of whom are very good examples of this understanding of 
historical sociology, with the work of Jürgen Osterhammel being a recent example from 
within the field of global history. There is perhaps also another approach, namely the 
application of sociological theory to the past without any attempt to account for the present 
(this probably accounts for much of what historical sociologists do, although not necessarily 
always in the form of comparative analysis. Much of this is primarily concerned with 
institutional analysis usually within national settings). There is also a wider question on the 
theory of history concerning what is the past and how it should be understood in relation to 
the present in terms of memory, history and heritage. However, the main contributors to this 
have been historians such as Le Goff (Le Goff 1992; see also Paul, 2015; Harzog, 2015). 
One of the most significant developments in comparative historical sociology has 
been civilisational analysis as pioneered by S. N. Eisenstadt (2000, 2003) and revived by 
Johann Arnason (2003) and others - the late Winfried Spohn and Jaroslav Krejci for example 
- who followed Eisenstadt’s lead in establishing civilisations as the primary units of 
comparative analysis for a historically oriented sociologyiv. Civilisational analysis in this 
tradition is also a good example of the close interacting fields of sociology and history. In 
contrast to earlier conceptions of civilisation, including those of classical sociology, 
civilisational analysis begins with the recognition of the pluralistic nature of civilisations 
without any presuppositions of a single model or the superiority of European civilisation, 
which is seen as one of many. For Arnason, more so than Eisenstadt, who gave primacy to 
European civilisation, this entails a strong perspective on the interactive dimension of 
civilisational patterns and dynamics (see also Adams et al 2011). Civilisations are shaped by 
  
their interactions with other civilisations, as opposed to being self-contained or self-
generating. While having enduring orientations, civilisations are not path-dependent or bound 
to an initial cultural programme. In this way, drawing from the work of Benjamin Nelson 
(1981), Arnason breaks from the strongly culturalist assumptions of Weber’s concept of 
civilisation as essentially model of the idea of culture, where culture is seen as a self-
contained and fairly homogenous order of values. Although Eisenstadt recognised the 
importance of civilisational encounters, it played a less role in an analysis that placed the 
defining core of civilisations on their different departures from the world religions that 
consolidated in the Axial Age. However, the problem of path-dependency cannot be entirely 
jettisoned, without compromising the coherence of the notion of civilisation. At some point in 
the history of a given constellation of elements a degree of path-dependency does take shape 
at least in the form of a common starting point (see Arjomand’s contribution to this issue). 
The proponents of civilisational analysis see civilisations as open to innovations due 
to their essential creativity and mutual encounters. They are not settled for once and for all. 
Indeed, in many cases there may be major disputes or divisions within civilisations, as 
illustrated by the example of doctrinal disputes within Christianity. While being defined by 
certain ‘structures of consciousness,’ to use Nelson’s term, civilisations  are also networks of 
power that have a material basis. However, they are not reducible to societies. National 
societies are to be seen as singularisations of civilizational patterns and thus need to be placed 
in a broader framework of analysis. This is perhaps the characteristic feature of the particular 
kind of comparative historical sociology fostered by civilisational analysis: societies are 
already linked due to their participation in a civilisational context. This leaves somewhat 
unanswered the question of whether some civilisations also take the form of national 
societies, such as Japan or China.  
While civilisational analysis highlights the critical role played by civilisational 
encounters, there is also the question of intra-civilisational routes and encounters. The 
pluralistic nature of civilisations makes them internally varied. This is particularly pertinent 
in the case of European civilisation and the Islamic world. Islam hardly constitutes a 
civilisation in itself, even if it provided the essential cultural reference points for several 
variations. This is also the case too of Europe, which cannot be said to consist of one 
civilisation but several. There are clearly some difficulties about what defines the basic core 
of civilisations if they are to contain variations. However, Arnason resolves this problem by 
recourse to an interpretative perspective that owes much to Merleau-Ponty and Castoriadis: 
  
civilisations are based on interpretative capacities; they are ‘ways of articulating the world’ 
around world-images and involve imaginary projections.  
I would like to conclude this discussion of civilisational analysis by pointing out four 
problems with its approach. I see these as problems rather than objections as such. The first is 
the problem of variation and singularity. If civilisations are characterised by a high degree of 
variation due to their internal difference, what then gives to them their basic singularity? This 
is all the more problematic if there is not a primary cultural core to civilisations. Presumably 
there are limits to the degree to which variation can be taken. However this requires some 
notion of path dependency to which the theory is committed. Nonetheless, the problem still 
remains. For example, should Europe and Asia be replaced by the notion of the unity of 
Eurasia? Where would this leave the notion of civilisation? 
The second problem is a related one of how much explanatory force can be given to 
the capacity of civilisational orientations to determine over the long term enduring 
continuities. This is especially a problem with Eisenstadt’s use of the term ‘axial age’ which 
gives too much weight to the emergence of the world religions to account for the course of 
history.  In view of the fact that the history of most societies and civilisations is characterised 
by major points of rupture, how much weight should be given to continuity? Civilisational 
analysis is required to compromise rupture to accommodate a strong thesis of continuity. The 
emergence of civilisations were undoubtedly - after the Neolithic revolution that saw the 
emergence of farming - the most significant development in the early history of human 
societies, but their long-term significance cannot be so important when it comes to the 
lineages of development in the modern era. The only solution to this problem is to down play 
modernity. But this is a case of throwing out the baby with the bathwater. 
The third problem concerns the place of the present. Civilisational analysis sees 
modernity – it all its variants – as the outcome of civilisational trajectories. The multiple 
forms that modernity take bears the imprint of civilisational origins.  The difficulty with this 
is not that civilisational orientations influence the form that modernity takes, but that the 
present is given reduced significance. It is difficult to reduce the major characteristics of 
contemporary societies to civilisational structures. The question then is what is the 
contribution of civilisational analysis to the analysis of contemporary society? It is not 
apparent, for example, that many social and political struggles - anti-capitalist protests, 
environmental movements - are primarily civilisational in character or whether the 
civilisational characteristics are the most salient ones. It is true of course that Eisenstadt has 
  
overcome this problem with the argument that modernity is a new kind of civilisation. This is 
a debate, which I cannot address here. 
The fourth problem - the chief concern of this paper - is that civilisational analysis, as 
one of the most important developments within comparative historical sociology since the 
early 1990s, has not clarified its relationship with transnationalism. The place of transnational 
connections continues to occupy a minor place. While it is indeed true that Arnason has 
stressed the importance of the inter-civilisational dimension, this is largely a corrective to an 
older and more normative conception of civilisations as singular. Whether or not this is a 
problem is undoubtedly a matter of what weight we give to transnationalism and to the 
interconnected nature of the world, as signalled by the notion of entangled history. It is clear 
that contemporary transnational history as well as much of global history has taken the strong 
view that the fabric of social existence is constituted by such links and that civilisations are 
constituted by interactions. It would appear that for civilisational analysis such interactions 
are rather more of the order of influences than major formative factors.  
There are other problems, which I will not consider, such as the very fundamental 
problem of taking the very notion of a civilisation - which in general derives from the 
European and Asian historical traditions - and applying it to the very different historical 
experiences of the southern hemisphere (see Aurea Mota’s contribution to this volume). 
Notwithstanding these problems civilisational analysis is to be credited with developing and 
applying an interpretative approach to sociological inquiry that offers an alternative to purely 
historical analysis, 
 
The Future of Comparative Historical Sociology 
Comparative history since the recent interest in transnationalism  has undergone both crisis as 
well as renewal. The presuppositions and nature of comparative analysis have been 
challenged by notions of entanglement and transnationalism. The historians may have a 
problem with the nature of comparison if everything is now supposed to be either entangled 
or  – the other extreme – due to the Eurocentric presuppositions of scholarship, it is no longer 
possible to discuss non-western societies using the language of comparison. Dipesh 
Chakrabarty (2000) has provided the most robust rejoinder to the latter challenge. Yet, while 
comparison is potentially able to add rather than detract from global and transnational history, 
it has not yet been fully worked out how this might be possible. This is less because of the 
problems of the comparative approach than of a weak theorisation of transnationalism, which 
  
unlike comparison is not only a method of analysis but it is also a theory of society in so far 
as it is linked to a wider theory of the interconnected nature of societies. 
In contrast, the situation in historical sociology in so far as it can be separated from 
historical analysis is different but ambivalent. There the comparative dimension continues 
relatively unscathedv, but the full implications of the shift to the transnational have not had a 
major impact. Despite considerable cross-fertilisation as in the work of Osterhammel (2014) 
and Chakrabarty (2000) here has also been relatively little interaction between global history 
and historical sociology.vi   
However, the crisis of historical sociology is only superficially the case, since as 
argued above, historians remain largely concerned with the past and have not replaced the 
need for an interpretation of the present and its futures. Indeed, much of global history is a 
product of imperial history and the making of the modern world through colonialism. One of 
the distinguishing features of historical sociology, in contrast, is that it strives to address the 
present in relation to the future and is better equipped to offer a theory of society. The 
analysis of long-term trends is thus a key feature of historical sociology, which is less 
concerned with the differences than with convergences over time. But still it seems that the 
full implications of the transnational analysis have been missed in historical sociology at a 
time when it is being embraced more fully by other disciples, such as anthropology which is 
rediscovering history and transnationalism  (see for example Trouillot, 2003). The concerns 
of civilisational analysis foreground other issues and the approach tends to obscure rather 
than clarify the implications for the present.  
Yet, there are grounds of optimism. The theoretical premises of comparative historical 
sociology offer a sound basis on which the field can develop. I am not convinced that the 
focus on civilisations is the only way, though the role of civilisational factors cannot be 
excluded in any long-term analysis.vii The strong role that the interactionist and interpretative  
perspective has in the work of Arnason has the potential to offer a more developed theoretical 
underpinning of the notion of transnationalism connections, which is often theoretically 
undeveloped in the work of historians. Although this perspective is tied to the presuppositions 
of the civilisational framework, which tends to presuppose civilisations as somehow prior 
existing to their interactions, it does have the potential for a more radical application. 
Coupled with the interpretative perspective, it points to a considerably more pluralised 
approach to historical processes and the analysis of the ways in which the past has a bearing 
on the present. This is also clearly demonstrated in the work of William Sewell (2005). 
  
It is in this regard that there is considerable shared ground with history, and especially 
with conceptual history. Both conceptual history - in its various traditions including those of 
Foucault, Koselleck, White, Skinner - and the historical sociology of Arnason and Wagner 
have in common a strongly interpretative dimension and which is entirely compatible with 
the comparative approach. However, the implications of transnationalism are less clearly 
developed than they are in the relatively new field of global intellectual history (Moyn and 
Sartori 2013). 
What is in need of greater clarification is the nature of the sociological in historical 
sociology. Too often it is the historical that is emphasised, with the result that historical 
sociology loses its specificity. What then is needed? What does the sociological dimension in 
historical analysis add?  
The distinguishing feature of comparative historical sociology is the concern with 
macro-sociological theorising, in particular the intersection of social agency, time and 
structure. As with sociological reasoning generally, historical sociology approaches a given 
unit or event by placing it in a larger context, as well as offering a longer run analysis that 
includes addressing the open horizon of the future. Historians operate with shorter time 
frames and with more circumscribed topics. As Sewell (2005: 11) has perceptively 
commented, historians also tend to narrate their way through conceptual difficulties with the 
result that temporal dynamics about causation get lost in narrative detail (see also Maier, 
2000).  
One of the challenges for historical sociology is to develop new theoretical 
approaches that address more fully the long-term historical significance of social action and 
its impact on structure forming effects. In this structure is probably the most in need of 
development. Concepts such as civilisation are specifically concepts of structure in that they 
refer to durable configurations that persist over time. Historical sociology is about 
understanding how such social actors construct through their action and interpretations of the 
world new structures or change existing ones. It is thus ultimately about the explanation of 
social, economic, cultural and political structures as constructed or generated by social action 
and having transformative effects over time. It is this that brings the concerns of comparative 
historical sociology to the present. Unlike the historian, the historical sociologist seeks to 
explain the present and to discern future possibilities. Foucault was, like Weber, essentially a 
historical sociologist with his method of writing a ‘history of the present.’ There are some 
important exceptions, such as Hartog’s major work on ‘regimes of historicity’, which may be 
  
another example of historians taking the lead; although in this case the approach is not 
without its problems when it comes to the analysis of the present day (Hartog 2015). 
The real challenge for comparative historical sociology is to embrace more fully the 
implications of transnationalism and to do so without giving up on comparison. As I have 
argued, transnationalism has had a transformative impact on global history. Comparative 
historical sociology is still tied to the concerns of an older conception of how the modern 
world was formed. Despite the depth of analysis that one finds in civilisational theory, the 
account of the formation of the modern world is too rooted in a northern hemisphere 
perspective and one that does not fully embrace transnational linkages. The modern world did 
not simply spring forth from the old civilisations, but from their ruins and from many 
networks, global linkages, the flows of not just peoples, but ideas and culture more generally. 
One of the most promising lines of inquiry for comparative historical sociology and which 
would bring comparative analysis onto a new level more generally would be to address the 
transnational in terms of entanglements rather than in terms of endogenous factors. This 
needs to be done in a way that overcomes one of the major problems with the established 
comparative approaches, namely the tension between looking at the units in question as 
separate – as already formed endogenously and thus as separate – or as connected and thus to 
be explained by exogenous factors. What transnational and global analysis draws attention to 
is the logic by which spatial and temporal entities are formed. In this view, then, the 
comparative task is to look at different modes of entanglement. The concept of entanglement 
itself needs to be developed to show what both precedes it and what is produced as a result of 
entanglements. The following can only be a brief outline of a possible future direction for 
comparative historical sociology to embrace more fully the transnational challenge.  
Entanglements arise as a result of prior spatial and temporal processes interacting. 
This does not always or necessarily lead to their entanglement. Where this occurs a condition 
arises whereby the histories of different worlds become irreversibly linked. A further 
outcome is the creation of hybrid worlds in which the previous entities lose their separateness 
and the entanglement generates new entities, which may not necessarily be entirely new 
societies, but might be manifest in the formation of new socio-cultural imaginaries and in 
other structures. The notion of modernity  – and too but much more problematically  –  the 
notion of civilisation, highlights such transformations in the spatial and temporal structures of 
societies. There is considerable scope for a global and comparative historical sociology of the 
modern world that is addressed to the analysis of such phenomena, a characteristic of which 
  
is that they are all products of the transnational intermingling of societies.   
         
 
Conclusion 
The paper has argued that historical sociology, with its rich background in classical sociology 
and in world history, needs to re-embrace transnationalism if it is to be of major relevance to 
the analysis of current times. The interpretative tradition within historical sociology, as 
represented in the work of Johann Arnason and Peter Wagner, offers a sound basis on which 
to develop a comparative historical sociology of what is now a fully transnationalised world. 
In this respect the concern with modernity probably offers a more promising prospect than 
the notion of civilisation. There are undoubtedly great challenges in this for comparison as a 
method of analysis. In order to develop this perspective, more emphasis will need to be given 
to transnationalism which, as proposed in this paper also needs to be theorised in light of new 
ideas about how social realities are generated.  
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Endnotes 
i See Hunt (2014), Karakani  (2014), Rosenberg (2012, 2014), Sachsenmaier (2011). 
ii See Moyn and Sartori (2013) for a recent contribution on global intellectual history. 
iii This too is the case with Heinrich Winkler's three volume Geschichte des Westens (2011, 2014, 
2015). 
iv See also Aromand (2015), Arjomand and Tiryakian (2004), Arjomand and Reis (2013). 
v For example, the well-known volume by Mahnoney and Rueschemeyer (2003) does not distinguish 
between historians and sociologists. This is also the case with the work of Mann, Tilly, Sewell for 
example. 
vi See the volume edited by Adams et al (2005) which contains chapters that seek precisely to remedy 
this deficit. See also Bhambra (2009). 
vii I have argued this in Delanty (2013) where I have proposed the notion of European civilisation as an 
‘inter-civilisational constellation’. 
